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What variety of employment service quasi-market? Ireland’s Job 
Path as a private power market 
Dr Jay Wiggan 
Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, social protection and labour market policies among Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states have been recalibrated so as to make the 
promotion of entry to the labour market for working-age individuals the priority of state 
intervention. Traditional concerns with income replacement in times of unemployment or income 
assistance to help meet the costs of life contingencies (disability, parenting) continue, but the 
emphasis has shifted to enacting reforms that ‘activate’ people into paid work (Bonoli, 2013). 
Accompanying changes to benefit eligibility, value and conditionality, and job placement and 
assistance schemes have been changes to the institutional arrangements for the delivery of benefit 
administration and public employment services. One of the most striking reforms has been the 
introduction of quasi-markets, through which various functions, previously performed by the public 
employment service or designated social partners, have been contracted out to for- profit and not-
for-profit organisations through competitive tendering. Employment service marketisation has 
become commonplace across OECD states, but there is considerable diversity in how states 
configure market regulation, choice and competition, which effects how service users, service 
providers and the state act within the market, and their capacity to influence its evolution (van 
Berkel et al, 2012; Struyven, 2014; Zimmerman et al, 2014;Wiggan, 2015). 
This chapter provides a case study of a new employment service quasi-market introduced in 2015 by 
the Irish government. Ireland is an interesting case as, while it may seem an ostensibly liberal 
welfare regime, its levels of expenditure on labour market programmes have been somewhat higher 
than other Anglo-Liberal welfare states such as the UK (Immervoll and Scarpetta, 2012, p 12). Until 
recently it was also a laggard in its embrace of the types of activation recalibration and employment 
service marketisation reforms embraced elsewhere (Murphy, 2012). In the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2008-09 and the Irish bank bailout of 2010 (see below), this has changed, and a programme 
of rapid ‘modernisation’ has taken place. Reforms to social security benefits have strengthened 
work-related conditionality, a new ‘one-stop shop’ integrating benefits and employment service 
support has been introduced and, from 2015, employment services for the long-term unemployed 
have been outsourced under the new JobPath programme. The focus here is an examination of 
JobPath to identify what kind of quasi-market it is, and what this implies for the role and influence of 
service users, the state or service providers. To facilitate this I draw on the typology of quasi-markets 
developed by Gingrich (2011). Based on analysis of institutional arrangements, socioeconomic 
context and partisan political preferences, this is a sophisticated conceptual tool for categorising 
quasi-markets and identifying which market interests (service users, providers and the state) and 
political party preferences are privileged by different market arrangements. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section is an account of the political-economic context in 
Ireland within which JobPath has developed. The second provides an elaboration of Gingrich’s (2011) 
typology of quasi-markets. The third section applies this analytical approach to unpack Ireland’s 
JobPath. The investigation indicates the new employment service quasi-market has few instruments 
available to empower service users, and instead privileges new service provider interests, while 
retaining a role for the state in shaping service standards. The fourth section discusses the potential 
partisan political logic underpinning both the embrace of provider interests and retention of a role 
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for the state. What is particularly interesting about the configuration of the JobPath market is that it 
is similar in policy direction and content to the provider-directed market in employment services 
that Wiggan (2015) argues has developed in Britain under the Conservative-Liberal coalition 
government. A full comparison of the systems in Ireland and Britain would make a useful 
contribution to the literature on diversity in activation markets (van Berkel et al, 2012; Struyven, 
2014; Wiggan, 2015), but is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, as an initial, if limited, 
contribution to sketching out the diversity in activation markets, the fourth section also provides a 
brief comparison of outcome-based funding, provider competition and service quality regulation in 
Ireland’s JobPath and Britain’s Work Programme. The fifth section concludes. 
 
Context: developing activation, service integration and marketisation in Ireland 
The global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 left Irish banks particularly at risk of collapse given 
their lending practices during the boom. The decision of the Irish state to guarantee the liabilities of 
all its banks initially stabilised the situation, but by 2010, the unprecedented scale of the losses 
facing the banks led Ireland to seek financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and European Union (EU) (Dukelow, 2011, p 408). In exchange for a package of loans, the Irish 
government agreed to a programme of welfare state reforms and public expenditure cuts, outlined 
in a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ with the IMF, the European Central Bank and European 
Commission (hereafter the ‘Troika’) (European Commission, 2011, p 42; Hick, 2014, p 398). 
Prior to the economic crisis, propitious economic growth meant successive centrist Fianna Fáil-led 
governments had been able to deliver notable improvements to existing social security benefits, and 
had shown little interest in the development of a comprehensive active labour market strategy. 
Since 2008, however, the value of key working-age benefits has been cut, and/or changes to 
eligibility and work-related conditions have been introduced. While this began with the Fianna Fáil-
Green Party coalition government, it has continued under the Fine Gael-Labour Party coalition 
government of the centre right and Social Democratic left that took office following the February 
2011 General Election (Little, 2011, p 1309; Dukelow, 2015; Murphy, 2014, p 138). Responsibility for 
delivering social security and employment and training services, meanwhile, had long been 
fragmented between multiple government departments and agencies.1 The resulting divergent 
institutional interests made gaining a consensus on activation reforms difficult, and this contributed 
to the slow and limited adoption of active labour market policies (Murphy, 2012, p 36). The 
agreement with the Troika gave impetus to domestic policy-makers to ‘modernise’ social protection 
and labour market policy and governance to seek a seemingly more cost-effective and ‘work first’ 
orientated active labour market regime (Murphy, 2012, 2014; Dukelow, 2015). Reviews by the OECD 
and the Irish government of Ireland’s activation regime portrayed it as comparably high cost, poorly 
targeted and ineffective (DPER, 2011: 12-14; Grubb et al 2009, pp 128-38; DSP, 2012b; see also 
McGuinness et al, 2011). The dominant unemployment policies were public sector job creation 
schemes and vocational training, criticised by the OECD as among the least effective tools for 
securing rapid labour market reintegration (OECD, 2000, p 98; DSP, 2012b). In 2011, for example, 
€348 million of the €770 million that Ireland’s Department of Social Protection (DSP) spent on 
working-age employment schemes was spent on a single job subsidy scheme – the Community 
Employment Programme (CEP) (DSP, 2012b, p 11). The Fine Gael-Labour coalition government has 
not discontinued CEP, and has, in fact, introduced additional job creation and wage subsidy schemes 
(DSP, 2012a, p 13), but it has also embarked on a programme of rapid organisational restructuring. 
As a result, Ireland has belatedly adopted the types of service integration and marketisation that has 
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become commonplace among the social security administration and employment service delivery of 
other OECD states (Askim et al, 2011; van Berkel et al, 2012; Minas, 2014; Struyven, 2014). In line 
with the Fine Gael-Labour coalition’s Programme for government (Department of the Taoiseach, no 
date, p 8), various social protection and public employment service organisations have been merged 
into a single government department – the Department of Social Protection (DSP) – and delivery 
rationalised. For example job assistance, placement and benefit administration for short-term 
unemployed claimants have been integrated, creating a new ‘one stop shop’, known as ‘Intreo’ 
(Martin, 2014, p 15). Employment support for the long- term unemployed provided under the Fine 
Gael-Labour coalition government’s new JobPath programme (see below) has, however, been 
contracted out to private and third sector providers. Policy-makers have suggested this is a practical 
means to secure additional staffing capacity and to gain access to previously untapped private and 
third sector ‘expertise’ in client advice, job placement and employer engagement activity (DSP, 2011, 
p 36; DSP, 2012c, p 20, 2013a, p 35, 2014a, 2014b, pp 20-1). Whether or not this was necessary or 
will provide the access to expertise that results in higher job entry and sustainability is beyond the 
focus of this particular chapter. Our interest here is in understanding the type of quasi-market 
emerging, and what this implies in terms of whose preferences and interests are being 
prioritised/marginalised. The following section sets out the theoretical and analytical framework 
used to facilitate this. 
  
Unpacking and explaining variation in public service quasi- markets 
The marketisation of public employment services has typically retained some role for the state as 
purchaser and/or regulator of service provision, while introducing instruments to foster competition 
and/or choice into the organisation of a public service on the grounds that market rationality 
induces improvements in efficiency, economy, innovation, responsiveness and effectiveness 
(Wiggan, 2015). The marketisation of public employment services is, therefore, a form of quasi-
market, but this on its own tells us little about how the market shapes and is shaped by those 
involved in the market – the state, service providers and service users. We know, for example, that 
quasi-market arrangements vary substantially, both within and between policy sectors and 
countries, and over time. Scholars have unpacked the instruments used in such markets as a means 
to identify and classify markets, often according to some notion of more or less 
competition/consumer choice (Anttonen and Meagher, 2013, p 16; Powell, 2015, p 114). The 
approach developed by Gingrich (2011, p 212) encompasses choice and competition, but also 
includes the financing and regulation of markets by the state.  
The former relates to how public services are produced in the market, while the latter relates to how 
access to services is allocated in the market (Wiggan, 2015, p 4). Different combinations of 
competition/choice indicate how the production of services within the market is configured around 
the needs and (dis)empowerment of either the state, service users or providers. Examination of 
allocation mechanisms in turn gives some indication of whether equity among service users and 
broader implications for social solidarity is prioritised or not. For example, services may be free at 
the point of use because they are financed by the state, or access may depend on payment by the 
individual user, potentially curbing use of services by those on low incomes. Extensive regulation of 
provider activity by the state ostensibly promotes equitable access to services and underpins quality, 
whereas weak regulation empowers providers, giving them greater freedom to vary service access 
and/or quality offered to different users (Gingrich, 2011, p 12; Wiggan, 2015, p 4). How markets are 
configured effects how services are managed, regulated and accessed, and consequently, different 
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markets are more or less orientated to the state, service user or service provider. This, in turn, works 
to construct, support or undermine particular class coalitions and socioeconomic and political 
objectives. Establishing what types of market exist and what political actors and preferences they 
may support is, therefore, central to understanding variation in public service markets (Gingrich, 
2011, p 217). Based on assessment of production/allocation instruments, Gingrich identifies three 
broad categories of state, user or provider-driven markets that disaggregate into six quasi-market 
ideal types (Gingrich, 2011, p 12; see also Powell, 2015, p 111): 
• consumer-controlled market (CCM) or two-tiered market (TTM) (service user-driven) 
• state-managed market (SSM) or austerity market (AM) (state- driven) 
• pork barrel market (PBM) or private power market (PPM) (provider-driven). 
The two service user-driven ideal types are based on strong regulation of service user rights to 
choose between providers, and are either financed collectively (CCM) or individually (TTM). In CCM 
the perception is that introduction of user choice and funding attached to the user creates an 
incentive for providers to drive up service quality and to respond to the expressed preferences of 
users. The potential trade-off is that this may imply lower profits (provider) or higher public spending 
(state). In contrast, TTM is premised on the individualisation of service provision cost, either through 
direct charging or giving providers scope to offer differential quality provision. Those with the most 
resources and the fewest needs gain, but conversely, those with the greatest need and limited 
incomes lose (Gingrich, 2011, p 16). 
Achieving service efficiency and economy through the retention of state capacity to direct public 
service markets is the hallmark of SMM and AM. SMM relies on regulation, monitoring of state-
specified performance as a means to free providers to pursue cost-containment goals as they see fit, 
while the state retains arm’s-length oversight and control to promote service quality and equity. 
Collective financing of provision is retained to prevent the direct costs of accessing services falling on 
the individual. AM involves the state setting standards, but pursues efficiency and cost control 
through (partially) reallocating the cost of provision to reduce demand and encourage individual 
users to ration their use of provision (Gingrich, 2011, p 14). 
Where the state has withdrawn from extensive regulation or indicated its intention to exercise 
limited oversight, and users have few opportunities to exercise market choice or exit, then provider 
influence increases. According to Gingrich, this manifests in either PBM or PPM. PBM is a state-
financed market with services purchased via limited market competition, resembling a private 
oligopoly able to use its strong negotiating position and influence to gain greater access to public 
resources in a relatively benign public spending climate. PPM is similarly dominated by providers, 
but emerges in the context of public expenditure constraint with providers given freedom to bear 
down on service costs, either through user charges or market structures that permit selective 
provision/under-provision which transfers the burden of adjustment under austerity to individual 
users (Gingrich, 2011, p 17). Actual public service markets may, of course, differ in how close they 
adhere to these ideal types, but they provide a means for understanding how particular 
combinations of production and allocation favour different market interests and partisan 
preferences, and why such combinations merge in particular contexts (Gingrich, 2011, p 34). For 
Gingrich (2011, p 5), political parties of the left and right systematically favour different market types 
and seek reforms that best accord with their long-term ideological preferences and electoral 
calculations. In short, parties and governments of the right favour markets that constrain public 
spending and state provision, fragment social solidarity and make more comprehensive welfare 
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retrenchment and privatisation more feasible in the long run. Conversely, the left seek to use 
markets that retain state involvement in financing and/or oversight of welfare provision, while 
protecting social solidarity and helping construct/secure a less hostile environment for future state 
welfare expansion (Gingrich, 2011, p 38). The broader financial context, and whether the existing 
service and supporting welfare institutions (for example, social security, training policy) are 
uniform/fragmented and/or provided on a universal/residual basis (Gingrich, 2011, p 33), in turn 
mediates whether the environment is more or less hostile to reforms preferred by left or right 
political parties. The left might favour market structures that empower service users (CCM ideal 
type), but is unlikely to champion such reforms when services are residual and public support for 
greater spending is weak, as this risks exacerbating existing socioeconomic inequalities (Gingrich, 
2011, p 5). In such contexts, SMM may be the preferred compromise as it avoids empowerment of 
service providers that could further undermine the role of the state, and enables the left through the 
state to mitigate the potential for public service markets to lead to inequity in service access/quality. 
The right, in contrast, will enact provider- driven market reforms where possible, most likely in 
services that have limited public support, as the political and electoral opposition is weaker, enabling 
the right to advance market structures that both reduce existing state activity and create new 
constituencies for additional market reform. In the ‘Discussion’ section later we return to this issue 
and offer some tentative reflections on the potential connection between the JobPath quasi-market 
type and the partisan politics of market reform in Ireland. First, however, our attention turns to the 
JobPath market structure itself. 
 
JobPath: a private power quasi-market? 
Production 
In 2013, the procurement of JobPath commenced, with organisations invited to submit bids to 
manage service delivery as a single prime provider in one of four geographic contract area ‘lots’ (1-
4).The DSP also offered potential providers the opportunity to bid for a combined ‘lot’ (5 and 6), 
with each bundling together two separate contract areas (DSP, 2013a; INOU, 2014). Contracts are 
awarded for four years in the first instance, with the possibility of two one-year extensions. To bid 
for a contract each organisation (or partnership/consortia) was required to have an annual turnover 
of €20 million for each of the previous three years. Ostensibly this is to ensure that only 
organisations with a healthy financial track record could secure a contract, mitigating the risk 
inherent to a ‘payment by results’ system that an organisation is unable to manage the demands of 
resourcing investment in service provision upfront, and prior to receipt of outcome payments (DSP, 
2013a, p 17). In October 2014 the winning bids were announced as two combined ‘lots’, meaning 
that two prime providers were contracted to manage four contract areas, with each provider 
responsible for service provision solely in their own two contract areas. The combined ‘lot’ for 
provision in the north of the country was awarded to the private for-profit organisation Seetec (a 
prime contractor in the British Work Programme), and the second combined ‘lot’ for provision in the 
south went to a new third sector organisation, Turas Nua Ltd (DSP, 2014a) a partnership between 
(another Work Programme prime contractor) Working Links (Working Links, 2014) and FRS 
Recruitment (part of an Irish cooperative network). 
The decision to specify a high and consistent level of turnover as a requirement means the 
structuring of procurement curtails the number and type of organisations that are well placed to 
tender for JobPath. Larger organisations or consortia capable of satisfying the €20 million 
requirement and willing to take on (and perhaps have experience of) the degree of risk inherent to 
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an outcome-based system are privileged by this market structure. The losers are smaller, more 
specialist and/or local organisations less able and/or willing to compete on these terms, whose 
options are now to participate as sub-contractors within the supply chain of one of the two prime 
contractors. The decision to have each contract area managed by a single prime means there is no 
scope for post-procurement competition. There can be no intra-contract area peer pressure 
between competing providers, and the Department for Social Protection has no mechanism for 
reallocation of a portion of client caseload from poor to better performing providers. Consequently 
there is no scope for service users to directly exercise any choice of provider in the JobPath quasi-
market. The direction of the market is very much about the relationship between the state and the 
contracted provider(s), with service users at best enjoying a mediated influence on service provision. 
With no post-procurement competition or prescription of service content beyond the stipulation of 
a common service guarantee detailed below, the JobPath primes are relatively free to innovate in 
service provision. The state seeks to direct providers towards its policy objectives primarily via the 
financial incentives built into JobPath by a ‘payment by results’ system. 
The payment model is divided between a registration fee and a job sustainment fee, which, 
depending on job sustainment performance, means up to five payments to providers during a 
participant’s return to work journey. The registration fee is paid once a participant has completed a 
personal progression plan with the provider, with sustainment payments commencing for sustained 
employment at 13 weeks, 26 weeks, 39 weeks and 52 weeks (DSP, 2013a, p 133). At the time of 
writing the JobPath market is limited to the long-term unemployed and those at risk of long-term 
unemployment, but DSP has left open the possibility of expanding coverage to claimants of benefits 
paid on grounds of lone parenthood or sickness or disability (DSP, 2013a, p 39). The ratio of process 
fees to outcome fees in the JobPath quasi-market is 35:65 (DSP, 2013a). The retention of a 
substantial registration fee implies concern that relying solely on outcome payments could 
undermine the financial stability of providers and increase the incentives to ‘game’ the payment by 
results system. The caseload of programme participants is divided into six referral groups (RG 1-6), 
with four groups relating to the duration of a client’s receipt of a jobseeking benefit or assessment 
as having characteristics that place them at high risk of progressing into long-term unemployment 
(see Table 1). The income a provider receives for registration and job sustainment for each referral 
group has not been disclosed. DSP did indicate during procurement that fees should vary according 
to distance from the labour market (DSP, 2013b) as a means to encourage providers to serve both 
the job-ready and harder-to-place service users. 
The instruments of market production in JobPath show an interesting tension between DSP seeking 
to use contracted providers to create freedom to innovate, and the fear that this will undermine 
service quality. Rather than build a market where the service user is empowered to choose between 
different providers or is able to exit the market completely without financial penalty in the form of 
loss of benefits, the state has instead constructed a market where it acts as both the purchaser and 
the collective proxy customer. The private power market emerging in Ireland is then notable for the 
state’s attempt to retain some collective influence over how services are allocated through a 
measure of public regulation and monitoring.
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Table 1 High level overview of key features of the JobPath quasi market  
Contract Areas Four contract areas (six ‘Lots’ invited for tender as DSP allowed bidding on bundled ‘Lots’).  
Lot 1 (West, Midlands North, North East, North West) 
Lot 2 (Cork Central, South East; Mid-Leinster) 
Lot 3 (Mid West, South West, Midlands South) 
Lot 4 (Dublin Central; Dublin north, Dublin South) 
Lot 5 (Lots 1 and 4 together) 
Lot 6 (Lots 2 and 3 together)  
 
Providers Seetec  
Turas Nua Ltd 
 
Contract Duration 
 
Phase one: four years 
Phase two: one year extensions for maximum of two years 
 
Service quality Grey Box approach. Common set of minimum service requirements apply to each provider 
Annual service user satisfaction survey which can influence DSP to withhold a portion of provider fees 
 
Client referral 
groups 
RG 1: Unemployed receiving jobseeker benefit passing 12 months  
RG 2: Unemployed receiving jobseeker benefit 12-24 months  
RG 3: Unemployed receiving jobseeker benefit 24-36 months 
RG 4: Unemployed receiving jobseeker benefit 36 months + 
RG 5: Unemployed jobseeker benefit less than 12 months but high risk of long term unemployment 
RG 6: part time and in receiving jobseeker benefit, looking for full time paid work 
 Future referrals may expand to other groups e.g. recipients of one parent family benefit and sickness/ disability payments 
 
Differential pricing  
 
Payment model  
 
Yes 
 
Registration fee paid upon completion of Personal Progression Plan 
Job sustainment fee paid at 13weeks; 26 weeks; 39 weeks; 52 weeks 
Service user choice 
 
No 
Source: DSP (2013); (DSP, 2013a: 57; INOU, 2014)
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Allocation 
Long-term unemployed clients are not required to purchase employment services in a private 
market or to make a co-payment in order to access public provision. This is not surprising as there 
are good social and economic reasons why employment services are collectively financed. Given the 
concentration of unemployment among low-skilled, low- income individuals, it would be difficult to 
insure against this life risk and/or bear the cost of paying to access services. The collective financing 
of employment services ensures access is relatively equitable, and this improves the state’s capacity 
to ‘activate’ and match jobseekers to labour market vacancies. This does not, of course, eliminate 
the risk that allocation of services will be affected by the judgement providers make about the 
relative costs/benefits associated with moving clients with multiple or seemingly intractable 
constraints on employment into the labour market. JobPath attempts to mitigate this risk through its 
‘payment by results’ contracting model. Research into ‘payment by results’ systems in employment 
service quasi-markets, however, shows that providers always seek to maximise their income from 
job-ready clients and minimise their expenditure on the less job-ready (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; 
Finn, 2010). Policy-makers in Ireland are aware that market reforms that enhance provider freedom 
can also negatively affect service equity (DSP, 2013b, p 16), and the DSP has settled on a 
combination of state-mediated user ‘voice’ and state-mandated minimum service standards to 
promote equitable allocation of services. 
User voice is exercised ‘by proxy’, with the DSP collating service user views through surveys of 
participant satisfaction with service quality. Should a prime provider fail to achieve satisfactory 
ratings in the annual survey, the DSP may withhold up to 15 per cent of fees payable (DSP, 2014b, p 
1). The prescription of common minimum service provision is set out in the JobPath Service 
Guarantee (SG). This stipulates that providers must hold one-to-one meetings within 20 days of 
referral, and agree a personal progression plan with all clients. The plan must contain basic contact 
information and a detailed record of the client’s employment experience, skills and barriers to 
employment, and a plan setting out the return to work trajectory. The provider must hold a further 
one-to-one meeting with the client every 20 working days until they gain employment, and a full 
review of the plan must take place periodically (at 13 weeks, 26 weeks, 39 weeks) if the client 
remains unemployed. Where a programme participant has entered employment, the provider is 
responsible for delivering ‘in-work’ assistance during the first 13 weeks, which includes contact with 
a personal adviser within five days, and contact every subsequent 20 working days. A programme 
exit interview must also be held when a client reaches the end of their period of programme 
participation (12 months) (DSP, 2013a, pp 32-4). How effective the SG proves to be in promoting 
equity is necessarily an empirical question that must wait for programme evaluations. 
Discussion 
The contemporary political, economic and institutional arrangements in Ireland appear to favour the 
emergence of a provider-directed employment service market that seeks to expand private sector 
involvement in delivery, but also attempt to moderate the scope for providers to redirect the costs 
of serving all clients to the state or service users. Politically the coalition government in Ireland, for 
example, is dominated by the centre right Fine Gael Party, whose 2011 election manifesto indicated 
support for introducing some form of voucher system into employment service provision, while 
Labour made no mention of employment service marketisation at all (Fine Gael, 2011; Labour, 
2011). The Troika’s monitoring and reporting on the progress of the public service reforms and its 
encouragement of orthodox economic policy which has been embraced by the government 
(Dukelow, 2015) has meanwhile diminished the scope for state provision to be expanded to deliver 
Draft chapter Social Policy Review 27 
 
an intensify activation service for the long-term unemployed. Moreover, as a service concentrated 
on a small and stigmatised portion of the working-age population (the long-term unemployed), the 
ability of service users or left political actors to draw on wider public solidarity to promote either a 
state monopoly or development of a client-centric market is likely limited. Working within these 
policy and political parameters it is plausible that PPM would emerge, albeit a variant that offered 
some compromise to the Labour Party’s (they hold the social protection portfolio) core preference 
for protecting equity and retaining state involvement in welfare provision. 
A brief comparison of key market instruments (outcome-based funding and service quality 
regulation) in Ireland’s JobPath with those found in Britain’s similar activation scheme – the Work 
Programme – draws out the degree to which Ireland has embraced a PPM variant that places slightly 
less emphasis on provider empowerment and the primacy of market rationality. The Work 
Programme was introduced in Britain in 2011 under the centre right-dominated Conservative-Liberal 
coalition government that was committed to reducing state delivery of public services through 
market expansion (HM Government, 2011), and built on an established pattern of contracting out 
employment services (Gash et al, 2013). 
The commitment to market rationality and provider direction is built into the structure of the 
outcome-based funding system and model of service delivery. The British Work Programme’s 
payment by results system, for example, makes a higher proportion of provider funding dependent 
on them securing job outcomes than in Ireland’s JobPath. In the Work Programme, total funding 
available to providers over the course of the contract is intended to split 20:80, meaning that four- 
fifths of total payments to providers should be paid on the basis of job outcomes secured. 
Conversely, providers in Britain have been given greater freedom over service content through what 
is termed a ‘black box’ model of delivery. The British state has withdrawn from prescribing content 
in order to maximise provider freedom to innovate and shape the market. Instead, Work Programme 
prime providers each propose their own minimum set of services that are then agreed individually 
with British policy-makers (Wiggan, 2015). In contrast, Ireland’s JobPath suggests a more cautious 
embrace of market rationality and the empowerment of providers, and a greater role for state 
regulation and state-mediated user influence. The service to outcome fee payment ratio is lower, at 
35:65, and rather than a ‘black box’, a ‘grey box’ approach to service delivery is taken through state 
stipulation of common minimum provision through the JobPath SG. The service user survey also 
gives the state some means to ‘check’ the experience of users themselves, which, given the lack of 
post- contract award market competition, is a useful tool for policy-makers seeking to shape 
provider behaviour. In Britain there is no scope for the collective expression of services users to 
direct provider behaviour. Instead, policy-makers rely more on financial incentives and state-
mediated competition between providers that is possible due to the two to three providers 
operating in each contract area (Wiggan, 2015). The earlier unpacking of JobPath indicates it is a 
form of PPM, and comparison within another PPM (the British Work Programme) suggests that 
policy-makers in Ireland sought to create a PPM that reduces the scope and incentives for providers 
to game the system by retaining a comparably greater level of state intervention in the market. 
Further empirical investigation would be necessary, however, to establish whether, and how, this 
was influenced by organisations such as the Troika and/or the Centre for Economic and Social 
Inclusion2 and the specific preferences of Labour and Fine Gael. 
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Conclusion 
The economic crisis and ensuing implementation of austerity in Ireland has enabled successive Irish 
governments to reframe the social contract to emphasise responsibilities rather than entitlements, 
and to radically overhaul the organisation of social security and labour market policy to promote 
labour activation and the commodification of public employment services, through marketisation of 
provision for the long- term unemployed (Dukelow, 2014; Murphy, 2014). The investigation and 
unpacking of the new JobPath employment programme shows that the market reforms enacted 
have introduced a form of PPM in employment service provision for the long-term unemployed. The 
state has relinquished direct control of service provision, but has chosen not to introduce service 
user-centric market reforms that empower programme participants through offering a choice of 
provider. Nor has the state directed public resources to existing local providers of employment 
services in Ireland, which would indicate market reforms more akin to those of a PBM (Gingrich, 
2011). Instead, through setting a €20 million threshold for market entry, policy-makers in Ireland 
have deliberately constructed a market to appeal to new market entrants with the size and 
capability to advance and embed new provider-orientated market reforms. Yet policy-makers have 
also sought to protect equity in access to services through prescription and oversight of a common 
set of standards for all clients that each prime provider must adhere to. Policy-makers have 
seemingly determined that if service quality and reductions in benefit expenditure through job entry 
is to be maximised, retention of some state regulation is necessary to mitigate the tendency for 
providers to selectively invest resources in some (more job-ready) clients and not others (Shutes and 
Taylor, 2014, p 213).The JobPath market in this sense differs from the similar provider-directed 
employment service quasi- market introduced in 2010 in Britain, where policy-makers sought to 
maximise provider freedom and to minimise the direct influence of the state (and service users) (see 
Wiggan, 2015). 
 
Notes 
1 Prior to the reorganisation, FAS (under the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment) was the training and 
employment agency. An additional Local Employment Service (LES) provided job search assistance in a number of 
locations. Together FAS/LES formed Ireland’s Public Employment Service (Grubb et al, 2009, p 30). Mainstream social 
security was administered by the then Department for Social and Family Affairs with the Community Welfare Service (CWS) 
of the Health Services Executive administering Supplementary Welfare Allowance. From 2010 the employment and social 
security functions of FAS/CWS were moved to the new Department for Social Protection and work began on creating a new 
customer facing one-stop shop (Intreo). Intreo and LES now deliver social security and short-term employment support 
while from 2015, activation of the long-term unemployed is with contracted JobPath providers. 
2 The Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion is a British research and policy organisation brought in by the DSP to advise 
on employment service marketisation. 
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